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Anumber of factors inﬂuence an animal’s economic decisions.Twomost commonly studied
are the magnitude of and delay to reward.To investigate how these factors are represented
in the ﬁring rates of single neurons, we devised a behavioral task that independently manip-
ulated the expected delay to and size of reward. Rats perceived the differently delayed and
sized rewards as having different values and were more motivated under short delay and
big-reward conditions than under long delay and small reward conditions as measured
by percent choice, accuracy, and reaction time. Since the creation of this task, we have
recorded from several different brain areas including, orbitofrontal cortex, striatum, amyg-
dala, substantia nigra pars reticulata, and midbrain dopamine neurons. Here, we review
and compare those data with a substantial focus on those areas that have been shown to
be critical for performance on classic time discounting procedures and provide a potential
mechanism by which they might interact when animals are deciding between differently
delayed rewards.We found that most brain areas in the cortico-limbic circuit encode both
the magnitude and delay to reward delivery in one form or another, but only a few encode
them together at the single neuron level.
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INTRODUCTION
Animals prefer an immediate reward over a delayed reward even
when the delayed reward is more economically valuable in the
long run. In the lab, the neural mechanisms underlying this aspect
of decision-making are often studied in tasks that ask animals
or humans to choose between a small reward delivered immedi-
ately and a large reward delivered after some delay (Herrnstein,
1961; Ainslie, 1974; Thaler, 1981; Kahneman and Tverskey, 1984;
Rodriguez and Logue, 1988; Lowenstein, 1992; Evenden and Ryan,
1996; Richards et al., 1997; Ho et al., 1999; Cardinal et al., 2001;
Mobini et al., 2002; Winstanley et al., 2004b; Kalenscher et al.,
2005; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008; Ballard and Knutson, 2009;
Figner et al., 2010). As the delay to the large reward becomes
longer, subjects tend to start discounting the value of the large
reward, biasing their choice behavior toward the small, immediate
reward (temporal discounting). This choice behavior is consid-
ered to be impulsive because over the course of many trials it
would bemore economical to wait for the larger reward. Impulsive
choice is exacerbated in several disorders such as drug addiction,
attention-deﬁcit/hyperactivity disorder, and schizophrenia, alter-
ing the breakpoint at which subjects abandon the large-delayed
reward for the more immediate reward (Ernst et al., 1998; Jentsch
and Taylor, 1999;Monterosso et al., 2001; Bechara et al., 2002; Cof-
fey et al., 2003;Heerey et al., 2007; Roesch et al., 2007c;Dalley et al.,
2008). Although considerable attention has been paid to the neu-
roanatomical and pharmacological basis of temporally discounted
reward and impulsivity, few have examined the neural correlates
involved. Speciﬁcally, few have asked how delays impact neural
encoding in brain areas known to be involved in reinforcement
learning anddecision-making, and how that encodingmight relate
to less abstract manipulations of value such as magnitude. To
address this issue we developed an inter-temporal choice task suit-
able for behavioral recording studies in rats (Roesch et al., 2006,
2007a,b, 2009, 2010b; Takahashi et al., 2009; Calu et al., 2010;
Stalnaker et al., 2010; Bryden et al., 2011).
In this task, rats were trained to nosepoke into a central odor
port. After 0.5 s, one of three odors was presented. One odor sig-
naled for the rat to go left (forced-choice), another signaled go
right (forced-choice), and the third odor signaled that the rat was
free to choose either the left or right well (free-choice) to receive
liquid sucrose reward. The two wells were located below the odor
port as illustrated in Figure 1B. After responding to the well, rats
had to wait 0.5 or 1–7 s to receive reward, depending on trial type
(Figure 1A). The task was designed to allow for equal samples of
left and rightward responses (forced-choice)while at the same time
having a direct measure of the animal’s preference (free-choice).
In addition, use of free- and forced-choice trials has allowed us
to determine whether the brain processes free-choice differently
than forced instrumental responding andwhether or not observed
neural correlates reﬂect sensory or motor processing.
At the start of each session, we shifted the rats’ response bias
to the left or to the right by increasing the delay preceding reward
delivery in one of the two ﬂuid wells (1–7 s). During delay blocks,
each well yielded one bolus of 10% sucrose solution. After ∼60–
80 trials, the response direction associated with the delayed well
switched unexpectedly. Thus, the response direction that was asso-
ciated with a short delay became long, whereas the response
direction associated with the long delay in the ﬁrst block of trials
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FIGURE 1 | Size and Delay Behavioral ChoiceTask. (A) Figure shows
sequence of events in each trial in 4 blocks in which we manipulated the time
to reward or the size of reward. Trials were signaled by illumination of the
panel lights inside the box.When these lights were on, nosepoke into the
odor port resulted in delivery of the odor cue to a small hemicylinder located
behind this opening. One of three different odors was delivered to the port on
each trial, in a pseudorandom order. At odor offset, the rat had 3 s to make a
response at one of the two ﬂuid wells located below the port. One odor
instructed the rat to go to the left to get reward, a second odor instructed the
rat to go to the right to get reward, and a third odor indicated that the rat
could obtain reward at either well. At the start of each recording session one
well was randomly designated as short (a 0.5 s delay before reward) and the
other long (a 1 to 7 s delay before reward) (block 1). In the second block of
trials these contingencies were switched (block 2). In blocks 3 and 4 delays
were held constant (0.5 s) and reward size was manipulated. sh= short;
bg=big; lo= long; sm= small; (B) Picture of apparatus. (C) Percent licking
behavior averaged over all recording sessions during trials when a small
reward was delayed versus when a small reward was delivered after 0.5 s.
Licking is aligned to well entry (left) and reward delivery (right). Adapted from
(Roesch et al., 2006, Roesch et al., 2007b, Takahashi et al., 2009).
became short. During delay blocks, the intertrial intervals were
normalized so that the length of short and long delay trials were
equal, thus there was no overall beneﬁt to choosing the short delay,
but as we will describe, rats did so regardless.
These contingencies continued for∼60–80 trials at which time
both delays were set to 0.5 s and the well that was associated with
the long delay, now produced a large reward (two to three boli).
These contingencies were again switched in the fourth block of tri-
als. Trial block switches were not cued, thus animals had to detect
changes in reward contingencies and update behavior from block
to block.
It is important to emphasize that reward size and delay were
varied independently, unlike common delay discounting tasks.
Whereas other studies have investigated the neuronal coding of
temporally discounted reward in paradigms that have manipu-
lated size and delay simultaneously, our task allows us to dissociate
correlates related to size and delay to better understand how each
manipulation of value is coded independently from the other. As
we will show below, rats prefer or value short over long delays to
reward and large over small reward as indicated by choice perfor-
mance. We felt it was necessary to dissociate size correlates from
delay correlates because certain disorders and brainmanipulations
have been shown to impair size and delay processing indepen-
dently, sometimes in an opposing manner (Roesch et al., 2007c).
Although we do not manipulate the size of the reward along with
the length of the delay preceding reward delivery in the traditional
sense, any effects on choice behavior and neural ﬁring must be
dependent on the delay and reﬂect how time spent waiting for
a reward reduces the value of reward. The depreciation of the
reward value due to delay has been referred to as the temporally
discounted value of the reward (Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008).
In each of the studies that we will describe below, rats were
signiﬁcantly more accurate and faster on high value reward trials
(large reward and short delay) as compared to low value reward
trials (small reward and long delay) on forced-choice trials (Roesch
et al., 2006, 2007a,b, 2009, 2010b; Takahashi et al., 2009; Calu et al.,
2010; Stalnaker et al., 2010; Bryden et al., 2011). On free-choice
trials, rats chose high over low value and switched their preference
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rapidly after block changes. Thus, rats discounted delayed rewards,
choosing it less often andworking less hard to achieve it. Preference
of immediate reward over delayed reward was not signiﬁcantly
different than preference of the large over small reward.
In addition, behavioral measures have illustrated that delayed
rewards were less predictable thanmore immediate rewards in this
task (Takahashi et al., 2009). Even after learning, the rats could not
predict the delayed reward with great precision. Licking increased
rapidly prior to the small, more immediate reward and showed no
change prior to delivery of the delayed small reward (Figure 1C;
Takahashi et al., 2009). Instead, rats’ licking behavior increased
around 0.5 s after well entry on delayed trials (Figure 1C) corre-
sponding to the time when delivery of immediate reward would
have happened in the preceding block of trials (Figure 1C). Thus,
rats anticipated delivery of immediate reward, even on long delay
trials and, although they knew that the delayed rewardwould even-
tually arrive, they could not predict exactly when. Similar ﬁndings
have been described in primates (Kobayashi and Schultz, 2008).
In this article, we review neural correlates related to perfor-
mance of this task from several brain areas, with a stronger focus
on those areas that have been shown to disrupt behavior on stan-
dard delay discounting tasks after lesions, inactivation, or other
pharmacological manipulations (Cardinal et al., 2004; Floresco
et al., 2008).
ORBITOFRONTAL CORTEX
Impulsive choice in humans has long been attributed to dam-
age of orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), but the role that OFC plays in
inter-temporal choices remains unclear. OFC lesions decrease and
increase discounting functions depending on experimental design
and lesion location (Mobini et al., 2002; Winstanley et al., 2004b;
Rudebeck et al., 2006; Winstanley, 2007; Churchwell et al., 2009;
Sellitto et al., 2010; Zeeb et al., 2010; Mar et al., 2011). From these
data it has been clear that OFC is involved in inter-temporal choice
suggesting that it must carry information related to the length of
delay preceding the delivery of reward.
To investigate how delay and size were encoded in OFC, we
recorded from single neurons while rats performed the task
described above (Roesch et al., 2006). Consistent with previous
work, lateral OFC neurons ﬁred in anticipation of delayed reward.
As illustrated in Figure 2A, activity of many single neurons con-
tinuously ﬁred until the delayed reward was delivered, resulting in
higher levels of activity for rewards that were delayed (Figure 2A;
bottom; gray).
Surprisingly, the majority of OFC neurons in our study did not
show this pattern of activity (Roesch et al., 2006). Most OFC neu-
rons did not maintain ﬁring across the delay as illustrated by the
single cell example inFigure 2B. Under short delay conditions, this
neuron ﬁred in anticipation of and during the delivery of imme-
diate reward (top; black). When the reward was delayed (gray),
activity declined until the delayed reward was delivered, and thus,
did not bridge the gap between the response and reward as in
the previous example (Figure 2A). Interestingly, activity seemed
to reﬂect the expectation of reward by continuing to ﬁre when
the reward would have been delivered on previous trials (i.e., 0.5 s
after the response). This old expectancy signal slowly dissipated
with learning (Figure 2B).
FIGURE 2 | Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). (A) Single cell example of reward
expectancy activity. (B) Single cell example of a neuron that exhibits
reduced activity when rewards are delayed compared to when rewards are
delivered immediately (black). Activity is plotted for the last 10 trials in a
block in which reward was delivered in the cell’s preferred direction after
0.5 s (black) followed by trials in which the reward was delayed by 1–4 s
(gray). Each row represents a single trial, each tick mark represents a single
action potential and the colored lines indicate when reward was delivered.
(C) Averaged ﬁring rate of all OFC neurons that ﬁred signiﬁcantly (p<0.05)
more strongly during a 1-s period after reward delivery compared to
baseline (adapted from Roesch et al., 2006).
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Thus, it appears that although many OFC neurons maintained
representations of the reward across the delay,most did not. Over-
all activity across the population of reward-responsive neurons
was stronger during delivery of immediate reward as compared to
delayed reward (Figure 2C). These changes in ﬁring likely had a
profound impact on inter-temporal choice. Indeed, ﬁring of OFC
neurons was correlated with the tendency for the rat to choose the
short delay on future free-choice trials (Roesch et al., 2006, 2007a).
We suspect that these two types of signals play very different
roles during performance of standard delay discounting para-
digms (Roesch et al., 2006, 2007a). Reward expectancy signals
that maintain a representation of the delayed delivery of reward
(Figure 2A)might be critical for facilitating the formation of asso-
ciative representations in other brain regions during learning. For
example, it has been shown that input from OFC is important
for rapid changes in cue–outcome encoding in basolateral amyg-
dala (Saddoris et al., 2005) and prediction error signaling in DA
neurons in ventral tegmental area (VTA). Loss of cue–outcome
encoding in downstream areas after OFC lesions may be due to
the loss of expectancy signals generated in OFC (Schoenbaum
and Roesch, 2005). If the purpose of expectancy signals in OFC
is to maintain a representation of the reward when it is delayed
so that downstream areas can develop cue or response–outcome
associations, then animals with OFC lesions would be less likely
to choose those cues or responses when they result in the delayed
reward. This interpretation is consistent with reports that lesions
of OFC can cause more impulsive responding (Rudebeck et al.,
2006).
The majority of OFC neurons ﬁred more strongly for imme-
diate reward (Figure 2B). These neurons likely represent when
an immediate reward is or is about to be delivered. When the
reward is delayed, this expectation of immediate reward is violated
and a negative prediction error is generated in downstream areas.
Negative prediction error signalswould subsequentlyweaken asso-
ciations between cues and responses that predict the now delayed
reward. These changes would drive behavior away from responses
that predict the delayed reward. Elimination of this signal could
make animals less likely to abandon the delayed reward as has been
shown in previous studies (Winstanley et al., 2004b).
To add to this complexity, a recent study suggests that dif-
ferent regions of OFC might serve opposing functions related
to inter-temporal choice (Mar et al., 2011). In this study, Mar
and colleagues showed that lesions of medial OFC make rats dis-
count slower, encouraging responding to the larger delayed reward,
whereas lateral OFC lesions make rats discount faster, decreas-
ing preference for the larger delayed reward. How does this relate
to our data? It suggests that neurons that bridge the gap during
the delay preceding reward delivery might be more prominent
in lateral OFC. This hypothesis is consistent with human imag-
ing studies showing a positive correlation between OFC activation
and preference for delayed reward (McClure et al., 2004, 2007;
Hariri et al., 2006; Boettiger et al., 2007; Mar et al., 2011). These
data also suggest that neurons that exhibit reduced activity for
delayed reward, ﬁring more strongly for immediate reward, might
be more prominent in medial OFC. This hypothesis is consistent
with human imaging studies showing that activation of medial
OFC is positively correlated with preference of more immediate
reward (McClure et al., 2004, 2007; Hariri et al., 2006; Mar et al.,
2011). Future studies will have to examine whether this theory
is true and/or if other signals might be involved in generating the
opposing symptomsobserved aftermedial and lateralOFC lesions.
Notably, a number of other prefrontal cortical areas are thought
to be involved in processing delayed reward. Most of this work has
come from humans and in studies examining neural activity in
monkeys. For example, Kim et al. (2008) found that single neu-
rons in monkey prefrontal cortex (PFC) were modulated by both
expected size of and delay to reward in a task in which monkeys
chose between targets that predicted both magnitude and delay.
Human studies have backed these ﬁndings and have further sug-
gested that PFC, unlike OFC, might be more critical in evaluating
rewards that are more extensively delayed (e.g., months to years;
McClure et al., 2004, 2007; Tanaka et al., 2004; Kable andGlimcher,
2007; Ballard and Knutson, 2009; Figner et al., 2010).
BASOLATERAL AMYGDALA
Much of the evidence we have described for the general role of
OFC in anticipating future events and consequences can also be
found in studies of amygdalar function, in particular, the ABL
(Jones and Mishkin, 1972; Kesner and Williams, 1995; Hatﬁeld
et al., 1996; Malkova et al., 1997; Bechara et al., 1999; Parkinson
et al., 2001;Cousens andOtto, 2003;Winstanley et al., 2004d). This
is perhaps not surprising given the strong reciprocal connections
betweenOFC andABL and the role that ABL is proposed to play in
associative learning. ABL also appears to play a critical role during
inter-temporal choice. Rats with ABL lesions are more impulsive
when rewards are delayed, abandoning the delayed reward more
quickly than controls (Winstanley et al., 2004b; Cardinal, 2006;
Churchwell et al., 2009; Ghods-Shariﬁ et al., 2009).
As in many studies, activity patterns observed in ABL during
performance of our task were similar to those observed in OFC;
neurons represented predicted outcomes at the time of cue pre-
sentation and in anticipation of reward (Roesch et al., 2010b). The
two areas differed in that signals related to anticipated reward and
delivery didnot appear to be as reduced inABL as theywere inOFC
when rewards were delayed. This is evident by comparing popu-
lation histograms from both areas (OFC: Figure 2C versus ABL:
Figure 3A). The counts of neurons that ﬁred signiﬁcantly more
strongly for immediate reward did not outnumber the number of
neurons that ﬁredmore strongly for delayed reward inABL as they
did in OFC.
Another difference between ABL and OFC was that neurons
in ABL also ﬁred more strongly when reward was delivered unex-
pectedly. For example, many ABL neurons ﬁred strongly when
the big-reward was delivered at the start of blocks 3 and 4
(Figure 1A). Although the mainstream view holds that amyg-
dala is important for acquiring and storing associative information
(LeDoux, 2000; Murray, 2007), these data and others like it have
recently suggested that amygdala may also support other func-
tions related to associative learning such as detecting the need
for increased attention when reward expectations are violated
(Gallagher et al., 1990; Holland and Gallagher, 1993b, 1999; Bre-
iter et al., 2001; Yacubian et al., 2006; Belova et al., 2007; Tye
et al., 2010). Consistent with this hypothesis, we have shown
that activity during unexpected reward delivery and omission was
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FIGURE 3 | Basolateral amygdala (ABL). (A) Average ﬁring rate for all
reward-responsive neurons in ABL on the last 10 trials during immediate
(gray) and delayed (black) reward after learning. (B) Activity in ABL was
correlated with odor port orienting as deﬁned by the speed at which rats
initiated trials after house light illumination during the ﬁrst and last 10 trials
in blocks 2–4. These data were normalized to the maximum and inverted.
Error bars indicate SEM (adapted from Roesch et al., 2010b).
correlated with changes in attention that occur at the start of trial
blocks (Figure 3B) and that inactivation of ABL makes rats less
likely to detect changes in reward contingencies (Roesch et al.,
2010b).
Unfortunately, it is still unclear what sustained activity during
the delay represents inABL. Sustained activity inABLmight reﬂect
unexpected omission of reward, signaling to the rat to attendmore
thoroughly to that location so that new learning might occur.
It might also serve to help maintain learned associations and/or
to learn new associations when delays are introduced between
responses and reward delivery. Consistent with this hypothesis,
ABL lesions have been shown to reduce the selectivity of neural
ﬁring in OFC and ventral striatum (VS; Schoenbaum et al., 2003;
Ambroggi et al., 2008). If ABL’s role is to help maintain expectan-
cies or attention across the gap between responding and delivery
of delayed reward, then loss of this signal would increase impul-
sive choice as has been shown by other labs (Winstanley et al.,
2004b).
Finally, it is worth noting that other parts of the amygdalamight
be critical for inter-temporal decision-making. Most prominent is
the central nucleus of amygdala (CeA),which is critical for changes
in attention or variations in event processing that occur during
learning when rewards downshift from high to low value (Holland
and Gallagher, 1993a,c, 2006; Holland and Kenmuir, 2005; Bucci
and Macleod, 2007). We have recently shown that downshifts in
value, including when rewards are unexpectedly delayed, increase
ﬁring in CeA during learning (Calu et al., 2010). Changes in ﬁring
were correlated with behavioral measures of attention observed
when reward contingencies were violated, which were lost after
CeA inactivation (Calu et al., 2010). Surprisingly, inactivation of
CeA did not impact temporal choice in our task (Calu et al., 2010).
This might reﬂect control of behavior via detection of unexpected
reward delivery which happens concurrently with unexpected
reward omission during each block switch. To the best of our
knowledge, it is unknown how CeA lesions would impact per-
formance on the standard small-immediate versus large-delayed
reward temporal discounting task, but we suspect that rats would
be less impulsive.
DOPAMINE NEURONS IN VENTRAL TEGMENTAL AREA
Manipulations of DA can either increase or decrease how much
animals discount delayed reward (Cardinal et al., 2000, 2004;Wade
et al., 2000; Kheramin et al., 2004; Roesch et al., 2007c); however,
few studies have examinedhowDAneurons respondwhen rewards
are unexpectedly delayed or delivered after long delay (Fiorillo
et al., 2008; Kobayashi and Schultz, 2008; Schultz, 2010). As in pre-
vious work, unexpected manipulation of reward size in our task
impacted ﬁring of DA neurons in VTA. Activity was high or low
depending on whether reward was unexpectedly larger (positive
prediction error) or smaller (negative prediction error), respec-
tively, and activity was high or low depending on whether the
odor predicted large or small reward, respectively. Thus, consistent
with previous work, the activity of DA neurons appeared to signal
errors in reward prediction during the presentation of uncondi-
tioned and conditioned stimuli (Mirenowicz and Schultz, 1994;
Montague et al., 1996; Hollerman and Schultz, 1998a,b; Waelti
et al., 2001; Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2003; Nakahara et al.,
2004; Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Pan et al., 2005; Morris et al.,
2006).
DA neurons also signaled errors in reward prediction when
rewards were delayed (Roesch et al., 2007b). Delivery of an unex-
pected immediate reward elicited a strongDAresponse (Figure 4B;
immediate reward; red blotch; ﬁrst 10 trials), which was subse-
quently replaced by ﬁring to cues that predicted the short delay
after learning (Figure 4B; last 10 trials). That is, activity was
stronger at the end of the block (dashed blue line) than during
the ﬁrst several trials of that same block (solid blue line) just
after odor presentation (Figure 4C). Overall, population activ-
ity was the strongest during cues that predicted the immediate
reward (Figures 4A–C; Roesch et al., 2007b). Moreover, neurons
that tended to ﬁre more strongly for immediate reward also ﬁred
more strongly for cues that predicted large reward (Figure 4E).
When rewards were unexpectedly delayed, DA neurons were
inhibited at the timewhen the reward should have arrived on short
delay trials (Figure 4D; omitted reward; ﬁrst 10 trials). Again, this
negative prediction error signal transferred to cues that predicted
the delayed reward after learning (Figure 4D; last 10 trials). That is,
cue-related activity was still strong at the start of the block before
the rat realized that the cue no longer signaled short delay. During
odor sampling activity was the weakest when that cue signaled the
longest delay (Figure 4A; 7 s; cue onset).
Finally, consistent with delayed rewards being unpredictable
(Figure 1C), rewardsdelivered after longdelay elicited strongﬁring
(Figure 4A; 7 s; cue onset and Figure 4D; delayed reward). Activity
after 2 s did not increase with each successive delay increase. This
is likely due to rats updating their expectations as the delay period
grew second by second. All of these ﬁndings are consistent with
the notion that activity in midbrain DA signals errors in reward
prediction.
Importantly, our results are consistent with work in humans
and primates. Human fMRI studies demonstrate that VTA’s effer-
ents are active when participants are making decisions related
to more immediate reward (McClure et al., 2004, 2007; Tanaka
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FIGURE 4 | Dopamine (DA). (A) Average ﬁring rate of dopamine neurons
over forced- and free-choice trials. Color indicates the length of the delay
preceding reward delivery from 0.5 to 7 s. Activity is aligned on odor onset
(left) and well entry (right). (B,D) Heat plots showing average activity of all
cue/reward-responsive dopamine neurons during the ﬁrst and last
forced-choice trials in the second delay block when reward are presented
earlier (B) or later than expected (D). Activity is shown, aligned on odor
onset and reward delivery. Hotter colors equal higher ﬁring rates. (C) Plots
the average ﬁring over short and long delay trials aligned on odor onset.
Dashed and solid lines represent activity during early and late periods of
learning. Gray bar indicates analysis epoch for “E.” (E) Cue-evoked activity
in reward-responsive dopamine neurons covaries with the delay and size of
the predicted reward and its relative value. Comparison of the difference in
ﬁring rate on high- versus low value trials for each cue/reward-responsive
DA neuron, calculated separately for “delay” (short minus long) and
“reward” blocks (big minus small). Colored dots represent those neurons
that showed a signiﬁcant difference in ﬁring between “high” and “low”
conditions (t -test; p<0.05; Blue: delay; Green: reward; Black: both reward
and delay). Data is taken after learning (last 15 trials; adapted from Roesch
et al., 2007b).
et al., 2004;Kable andGlimcher, 2007; Ballard andKnutson, 2009).
Direct recordings from primate DA neurons during performance
of a simple pavlovian task are also consistent with our results
(Fiorillo et al., 2008; Kobayashi and Schultz, 2008). As in our
study, activity during delivery of delayed reward was positively
correlated with the delay preceding it reﬂecting the uncertainty
or unpredictability of the delayed reward. This might reﬂect the
possibility that longer delays are harder to time (Church and Gib-
bon, 1982; Kobayashi and Schultz, 2008). Consistent with this
interpretation, monkeys could not accurately predict the deliv-
ery of the delayed reward as measured by anticipatory licking
(Kobayashi and Schultz, 2008). Also consistent with our work,
activity during sampling of cues that predicted reward was dis-
counted by the expected delay. Speciﬁcally, the activity of DA
neurons resembled the hyperbolic function typical of animal
temporal discounting studies, reﬂecting stronger discounting of
delayed reward when delays were relatively short.
Thus, across species, it is clear that signals related to prediction
errors are modulated by cues that predict delayed reward. Such
modulation must act on downstream neurons in cortex and basal
ganglia to promote and suppress behavior during inter-temporal
choice. Prominent in the current literature is the idea that DA
transmission ultimately impacts behavioral output by inﬂuencing
basal ganglia output structures such as SNr via modulation of D1
and D2 type receptors in dorsal striatum (DS; Bromberg-Martin
et al., 2010;Hong andHikosaka, 2011). Indeed,we and others have
recently shown that DS and SNr neurons incorporate anticipated
delay into their response selective ﬁring during and prior to the
decision to move (Stalnaker et al., 2010; Bryden et al., 2011; Cai
et al., 2011).
We propose that bursting of DA neurons to rewards that are
delivered earlier than expected and the cues that come to predict
them would activate the D1 mediated direct pathway, directing
behavior toward the more immediate reward (Bromberg-Martin
et al., 2010). Low levels of dopamine, as observed when rewards
are unexpectedly delayed would activate the D2 mediated indirect
pathway so thatmovement toward thewell that elicited the delayed
rewardwould be suppressed (Frank, 2005; Bromberg-Martin et al.,
2010). Consistent with this hypothesis, it has been shown that
high and low DA receptor activation promotes potentiation of the
direct and indirect pathway, respectively (Shen et al., 2008), and
that striatal D1 receptor blockade selectively impairs movements
to rewarded targets, whereas D2 receptor blockade selectively sup-
presses movements to non-rewarded locations (Nakamura and
Hikosaka, 2006).
VENTRAL STRIATUM
Post-training lesions of VS, in particular nucleus accumbens core,
induces impulsive choice of small-immediate reward over large-
delayed reward (Cousins et al., 1996; Cardinal et al., 2001, 2004;
Bezzina et al., 2007; Floresco et al., 2008; Kalenscher and Pennartz,
2008). Although there are several theories about the function of
VS, one prominent theory suggests that VS serves as a limbic-
motor interface, integrating value information with motor output
(Mogenson et al., 1980). Consistent with this notion, several labs
have shown that VS incorporates expected value information into
its neural ﬁring (Bowman et al., 1996; Hassani et al., 2001; Carelli,
2002; Cromwell and Schultz, 2003; Setlow et al., 2003; Janak et al.,
2004; Tanaka et al., 2004; Nicola, 2007; Khamassi et al., 2008; Ito
and Doya, 2009; van der Meer and Redish, 2009). Until recently,
it was unknown whether VS incorporated expected delay infor-
mation into this value calculation, possibly serving as a potential
source by which representations of delayed reward might impact
inter-temporal choice.
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We have recently shown that single neurons in VS signal the
value of the chosen action during performance of our choice task
(Roesch et al., 2009). The majority of cue-responsive neurons in
VS ﬁred signiﬁcantly more strongly when rats anticipated high
value reward in one of the two movement directions. This is illus-
trated in Figures 5A–D, which plots the average ﬁring rate of all
cue-responsive neurons inVS for responsesmade in each cell’s pre-
ferred and non-preferred movement ﬁelds. Activity was stronger
prior to a response in the cell’s preferred direction (left column)
FIGURE 5 |Ventral striatum (VS). Population activity of odor-responsive
neurons reﬂected motivational value and response direction on
forced-choice trials. (A–D) Curves representing normalized population ﬁring
rate during performance of forced-choice trials for the odor-responsive
neurons as a function of time under the eight task conditions (high
value=black; low value=gray). Data are aligned on odor port exit.
Preferred and non-preferred directions are represented in left and right
columns, respectively. For each neuron, the direction that yielded the
maximal response was designated as preferred. Correlations in the
preferred (E) and non-preferred (F) direction between value indices
(short− long/short+ long and big− small/big+ small) computed for ﬁring
rate (during odor sampling) and reaction time (speed at which rats exited
the odor port after sampling the odor; adapted from Roesch et al., 2009).
when the expected outcome was either a short delay (Figure 5A;
black) or a large reward (Figure 5C; black) compared to a long
delay (Figure 5A; gray) or a small reward (Figure 5C; gray),
respectively. This activity most likely reﬂects common changes
in motivation because neural ﬁring during this period was corre-
lated with the motivational level of the rat, which was high under
short delay and large reward conditions (Figure 5E,F; Roesch
et al., 2009). This result is consistent with previous work show-
ing that activity in VS is modulated during inter-temporal choice
for immediate rewards (McClure et al., 2004, 2007; Kable and
Glimcher, 2007; Ballard and Knutson, 2009) suggesting that VS is
involved in decisions regarding discounted reward (but see Day
et al., 2011). We suspect that increased activation of neurons that
signal movement during short delay trials might cause animals
to choose the more immediate reward over the delayed reward
through some sort of winner take all mechanism (Pennartz et al.,
1994; Redgrave et al., 1999; Nicola, 2007; Taha et al., 2007).
Others suggest that temporally discounted value signals in VS
have less to do with the actual choice – which appears to be more
reliably encoded in DS – andmore to do with encoding the sum of
the temporally discounted values of the available options, that is,
the overall goodness of the situation. Unlike our task,monkeys, on
each trial, were presented with two options simultaneously. Each
option varied in magnitude and delay, and the location of the bet-
ter reward varied randomly. Color and number of cues signaled
size and delay, respectively. These contingencies did not change
over the course of the experiment.
Not only was activity in VS modulated by the value of the
delayed reward in this study, neurons in VS were more likely to
encode the sum of the temporally discounted value of the two
targets than the differences between them or the choice that the
monkey was about to make (Cai et al., 2011). Our results are sim-
ilar to these in that activity in VS was modulated by size and delay,
however we clearly show that activity in VS signaled the value and
the direction of the chosen option. This difference likely reﬂects
differences in the task design. In our task, rats form response biases
to one direction over the other during the course of the block
and rats constantly had to modify their behavior when contin-
gencies changed, thus response–outcome contingencies were very
important in our task. Further, we could not access whether or
not activity in VS represented the overall value of the two options
because the overall value of the reward did not change from block
to block. This was an important and interesting feature of the
monkey task and it is highly likely that monkeys paid close atten-
tion to the overall value associated with each trial before deciding
which option to ultimately choose.
Several studies, including ours, have also shown that VS neu-
rons ﬁre in anticipation of the reward (Roesch et al., 2009). This
is apparent in Figure 5A, which illustrates that activity was higher
after the response in the cell’s preferred direction on long delay
(gray) compared to short delay trials (black). Interestingly, the dif-
ference in ﬁring between short and longdelay trials after the behav-
ioral response was also correlated with reaction time, however the
direction of this correlation was the opposite of that prior to the
movement. That is, slower responding on long delay trials, after
the choice, resulted in stronger ﬁring rates during the delay pre-
ceding reward delivery. If activity in VS during decision-making
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reﬂects motivation, as we have suggested, then activity during this
period may reﬂect the exertion of increased will to remain in the
well to receive reward. As described above for OFC and ABL, this
expectancy signal might be critical for maintaining responding
when rewards become delayed. Loss of this signal would reduce
the rat’s capacity to maintain motivation during reward delays as
described in other contexts (Cousins et al., 1996; Cardinal et al.,
2001, 2004; Bezzina et al., 2007; Floresco et al., 2008; Kalenscher
and Pennartz, 2008).
Our data suggest two conﬂicting roles forVS in delay discount-
ing. We speculate that different training procedures might change
the relative contributions of these two functions. For example,
if animals were highly trained to reverse behaviors based on dis-
counted reward,as in the recording settingusedhere, theymight be
less reliant on VS to maintain the value of the discounted reward.
In this situation, the primary effect of VS manipulations might
be to reduce impulsive choice of the more immediate reward.
On the other hand, maintaining reward information across the
delay might be more critical early on during learning, when rats
are learning contingencies between responses and their outcomes.
Increasing delays between the instrumental response and rein-
forcer impairs learning in normal animals and is exacerbated after
VS lesions (Cardinal et al., 2004).
Besides directly driving behavior, as proposed above, other
theories suggest that VS might also be involved in providing
expectancy information to downstreamareas as part of the“Critic”
in the actor–critic model (Joel et al., 2002; O’Doherty et al., 2004).
In this model the Critic stores and learns values of states which
in turn are used to compute prediction errors necessary for learn-
ing and adaptive behavior. Neural instantiations of this model
suggests that it is VS that signals the predicted value of the upcom-
ing decision, which in turn impacts prediction error encoding
by dopamine neurons. Subsequently, DA prediction errors modify
behavior via connectionswith theDS (Actor) andupdatepredicted
value signals in VS. Thus, signaling of immediate and delayed
reward by VS would have a profound impact on reinforcement
learning in this circuit as we will discuss below.
INTEGRATION OF SIZE AND DELAY ENCODING
Do brain areas integrate size and delay information, providing a
context-free representation of value (Montague and Berns, 2002;
Kringelbach, 2005; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011)? If this hypothesis is so,
then neural activity that encodes the delay to reward should also be
inﬂuenced by changes in reward magnitude, either at a single-unit
or population level. We found that when delay and reward size
were manipulated across different blocks of trials, OFC, ABL, and
DS maintained dissociable representations of the value of differ-
ently delayed and sized rewards. Even in VS, where the population
neurons ﬁredmore strongly to short delay and large reward condi-
tions and activity was correlated with motivational strength, there
was only a slight insigniﬁcant tendency for single neurons to rep-
resent both size and delay components. Although many neurons
did encode reward size and delay length at the single cell level,
many neurons encoded one but not the other. This apparent trend
toward common encoding likely reﬂects the integration of value
into motor signals at the level of VS which is further downstream
than areas such as OFC and ABL.
Consistent with this hypothesis, when we recorded from neu-
rons more closely tied to the output of the basal ganglia, we
found that activity in SNr showed a signiﬁcant positive correlation
between reward size and delay (Bryden et al., 2011). This is illus-
trated in the single cell example in Figure 6A. Activity was higher
for short delay and large reward conditions for movements made
into the right well. Unlike OFC, ABL, and VS, those SNr neurons
that ﬁred more strongly for cues that predicted short delay (over
long delay) signiﬁcantly tended to ﬁre more strongly for cues that
predicted the large reward (over small reward; Figure 6B) similar
to what we described for DA neurons in VTA (Figure 4E).
Although these results are consistent with the notion that activ-
ity in SNr reﬂects a common output, even in SNr, correlations
between delay and size were relatively weak; leaving open the
interpretation that SNr might also maintain independent repre-
sentations of expected size and delay. These data suggest that we
have to move very close to the motor system before delay and size
are represented as a common signal, and it is not clear whether
such representations exist in many regions upstream. According
to our data, the majority of brain areas involved in the circuit
critical for learning and decision-making based on expected out-
comes and violations of those expectations encode delayed reward
independently from reward size.
The fact that we were able to dissociate the effects of reward
size and delay on single-unit activity in these areas indicates that
encoding of discounted reward might involve different neural
processes than those that signal expected reward value. This dis-
sociation is perhaps not surprising considering recent behavioral
data that supports the view that learning about sensory and tempo-
ral features of stimuli involve different underlying systems (Dela-
mater and Oakeshott, 2007) and that studies that report abnormal
delay discounting functions often report no observable change in
behaviors guided by reward size.
With that said, other studies have shown that neural activity
related to size and delay are correlated in several frontal areas in
primate cortex (Roesch and Olson, 2005a,b; Kim et al., 2008). For
example, in primates, OFC neurons that ﬁred more strongly for
shorter delays tended to ﬁre more strongly for larger rewards. Our
ability to detect independent encoding might reﬂect a species dif-
ference and/or a number of other task parameters; however we
would like to think that differences might emerge from differ-
ent levels of training. With extended training, OFC neurons may
become optimized to provide generic value representations. This
would have interesting implications as it would suggest that OFC
and possibly other brain areas might refrain from putting delay
and size on a common value scale until they have been integrated
for an extended time. Thismight be why single neurons in primate
frontal cortex and striatum have been shown to be modulated by
both size and delay (Kim et al., 2008; Cai et al., 2011).
Another possibility is that common value signals observed in
primates reﬂect the fact that, over time, short delay trials some-
times led to more reward. That is, since short delay trials took less
time to complete, more reward could be obtained over the course
of the recording session. Unlike the rat work, delays were not nor-
malized in some of these studies (Roesch andOlson, 2005a,b), thus
raising thepossibility that brain areasmight commonly encode size
and delay only when shorter delays are genuinely more valuable,
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FIGURE 6 | Substantial nigra pars reticulata (SNr). Activity of
single neurons in SNr reﬂects an interaction between expected
value and direction. (A) Activity of a single SNr neuron averaged
over all trials for each condition aligned on odor port exit during all eight
conditions (four rewards× two directions). Histogram represents average
activity over the last 10 trials (after learning) for each condition in a block of
trials. Each tick mark is an action potential and trials are represented by
rows. All trials are shown. (B) Correlation between size
(big− small/big+ small) and delay (short− long/short+ long) effects
averaged across direction (odor onset to odor port exit). Data was taken
after learning (last 10 trials for each condition within each block; Bryden
et al., 2011).
not just subjectively preferred. The possibility that these variables
might be encoded separately in primates is also consistent with
recent work showing that risk is sometimes encoded separately
from reward size in primate OFC (Kennerley and Wallis, 2009;
Kennerley et al., 2009, O’Neill and Schultz, 2010; Schultz, 2010;
Wallis and Kennerley, 2010).
A ﬁnal possibility is that we did not vary delay and magni-
tude simultaneously. True discounting studiesmanipulate size and
delay at the same time to demonstrate the antagonistic effects of
reward magnitude and delay. Certainly, Lee and colleagues have
found more integrative encoding of value in the brain than we
have using this procedure (Kim et al., 2008; Cai et al., 2011). This
would suggest that when size and delay are manipulated simulta-
neously the brain encodes them together, but when they are split
apart, they are represented independently. More work is necessary
to determine if this theory holds up. Still, there are other differ-
ences between tasks thatmight impact how the brain encodes these
two variables. In our task rats are constantly forming and updating
response–outcome associations as they learn to bias behavior in
one direction when rewards change in size or delay. Independent
representations of size and delay might help the brain cope with
these changing circumstances.
That fact that size and delay are not strongly correlated in most
brain areas that we have tested does not mean that the rat or that
other brain areas might treat them similarly. Remarkably, out of
all the brain areas that we have recorded from in this task only
the ﬁring of DA neurons in VTA showed a strong clear cut rela-
tionship between manipulations of delay and size (Figure 4E).
DA neurons ﬁred more strongly to cues that predicted a short
delay and large reward and were inhibited by cues that predicted
a small reward and a long delay (Figure 4E). These were the same
neurons in which activity reﬂected prediction errors during unex-
pected reward delivery and omissionwhen rewardwasmade larger
or smaller than expected and when reward was delivered earlier
or later than expected (Figure 4). The fact that the activity of
DA neurons represents cues that predict expected size and delay
similarly does not ﬁt well with the ﬁnding that other areas do
not, considering that it is dopaminergic input that is thought to
train up associations in these areas. Why and how delay informa-
tion remains represented separately from value is an intriguing
question and requires further investigation.
CONCLUSION
Here we speculate on the circuit that drives discounting behavior
based on the neural correlates related to size and delay as described
above. It is important to remember that much of this is based
on neural correlates and we are currently trying to work out the
circuit using lesion and inactivation techniques combined with
single-unit recordings.
According to our data, when an immediate reward is deliv-
ered unexpectedly, DA neurons burst, consistent with a signal that
detects errors in reward prediction (Roesch et al., 2007b). ABL
neurons also respond to unexpected immediate reward but sev-
eral trials later, consistent with signals that detect the need for
increased attention or event processing during learning (Roesch
et al., 2010b). As the rat learns to anticipate the reward, expectancy
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signals in OFC, ABL, and VS develop. We suspect that develop-
ment of expectancy signals ﬁrst occurs in OFC as a consequence
of error detection by DA neurons, and that OFC is critical for the
development of expectancy signals in ABL and VS. Although all
three areas ﬁre in anticipation of reward, they might be carrying
unique signals related to reward outcome values, attention, and
motivation, respectively. As expectancy signals increase, predic-
tion error signaling at the time of reward delivery decrease and
ﬁring of DA neurons start to ﬁre to cues that predict the immedi-
ate reward (Figure 4). Cue-evoked responses that develop in DA
neurons subsequently stamp in associations in OFC, VS, and DS.
Interactions between ABL and these areas might be particularly
important in this process; lesions of ABL impairs cue develop-
ment in OFC and VS (Schoenbaum et al., 2003; Schoenbaum and
Roesch, 2005; Ambroggi et al., 2008). It is still unclear whether
ABL–DA interactions are necessary for cue selectivity to develop
in themselves and in downstreamareas (Roesch et al., 2010a).After
learning, OFC and VS guide decision-making via reward speciﬁc
outcome values and affective/motivational associations, respec-
tively and with DS guiding behavior by signaling action–value and
stimulus–response associations (Stalnaker et al., 2010). Positive
prediction errors likely impact striatal output via D1 mediated
direct pathways to SNr promoting movement via disinhibition of
downstream motor areas (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010).
So what happens when rewards are delayed? After learning,
there are strong expectancy signals in OFC for the immediate
reward. Expectancy activity in OFC for the immediate reward per-
sists even when reward is no longer available at that time (e.g.,
Figure 2B). Thus, when the immediate reward is not delivered,
a strong negative prediction error is generated by DA neurons
(Figure 4B). Inhibition of DA should reduce associability with
reward in downstream areas, thus inhibiting responses to cues
signaling the location of the delayed reward. Further, attenuated
expectancy signals generated in OFC would reduce expectancy
signals reliant on it, as shown for ABL and possibly for VS,
that might aid in maintaining responding for the now delayed
reward (Saddoris et al., 2005). Reduction of these signals might
further decrease associability with the delayed reward. Subse-
quently, DA neurons start to inhibit ﬁring to cues that predict
the delayed reward, weakening associations in downstream areas
such as OFC, ABL, and striatum. Decreased DA transmission in
striatumwould impact theD2mediated indirect pathway inducing
increases in SNr ﬁring that increases suppression of movement by
inhibiting downstreammotor structures (Bromberg-Martin et al.,
2010).
It is important to note that these are not the only brain areas
involved in temporal discounting and inter-temporal choice. Sero-
tonin clearly plays a role but exactly what role it plays is still
a little murky. Serotonin depletion, sometimes, but not always,
steepens the discounting of delayed rewardsmaking animals more
impulsive (Wogar et al., 1993; Harrison et al., 1997; Bizot et al.,
1999; Evenden and Ryan, 1999; Mobini et al., 2000a,b; Cardinal
et al., 2004; Winstanley et al., 2004a,c; Denk et al., 2005; Cardi-
nal, 2006), and increased extracellular serotonin concentrations
promotes selection of large-delayed reward over smaller imme-
diate reward (Bizot et al., 1988, 1999). Furthermore, recent data
demonstrates that serotonin efﬂux in rat dorsal raphe nucleus
increase when animals have to wait for reward and single dorsal
raphe neurons ﬁre in anticipation of delayed reward (Miyazaki
et al., 2011a,b).
Work in humans has also clearly deﬁned a role for PFC and
other cortical areas in inter-temporal choice especially when deci-
sions have to made for rewards that will arrive in the distant
future (e.g., months to years; McClure et al., 2004, 2007; Tanaka
et al., 2004; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Ballard and Knutson, 2009;
Figner et al., 2010). These systems likely interact on several levels
to control behavior when expected rewards are delayed.
In conclusion, it is clear that discounting behavior is compli-
cated and impacts a number of systems. From the results described
above, when an individual chooses between an immediate ver-
sus delayed reward, the decision ultimately depends on previous
experience with the delayed reward and the impact that a delayed
reward has on neural processes related to reward expectation,
prediction error encoding, attention, motivation, and the devel-
opment of associations between stimuli, responses, and outcome
values. To elucidate the underlying cause of the many disorders
that impact impulsivity, we must address which of these processes
are impaired and further test the circuit involved in inter-temporal
choice.
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